Individual epistemology
- (in preparation) ‘How should your beliefs change when your awareness grows?’
- (2022) ‘Accuracy-first epistemology without Additivity’ Philosophy of Science
- (2021) ‘On the pragmatic and epistemic virtues of inference to the best explanation’ Synthese
- (2021) ‘Radical epistemology, structural explanations, and epistemic weaponry’ Philosophical Studies
- (2021) ‘Bayesian updating when what you learn might be false’ Erkenntnis
- (2020) ‘Logical Ignorance and Logical Learning’ Synthese
- (2020) ‘A Note on Deterministic Updating and van Fraassen’s symmetry argument for Conditionalization’ Philosophical Studies
- (2020) ‘The Principal Principle does not imply the Principle of Indifference’ British Journal of Philosophy of Science
- (2019) ‘What is Conditionalization, and why should we do it?’ Philosophical Studies
- (2019) ‘Internalism, externalism, and the KK principle’ (with Alexander Bird) Erkenntnis
- (2019) ‘On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism’ Noûs
- (2019) ‘Veritism, epistemic risk, and the Swamping Problem’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- (2018) ‘What is Justified Credence?’ Episteme
- (2018) ‘An Accuracy-Dominance Argument for Conditionalization’ (with R.A. Briggs) Noûs
- (2018) ‘Making things right: the true consequences of epistemic consequentialism’ in Ahsltrom-Vij, K. & J. Dunn (eds.) Epistemic Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
- (2018) ‘Précis’ and ‘Replies to Critics’ for Book Symposium on Accuracy and the Laws of Credence, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- (2017) ‘Epistemic utility and the normativity of logic’ Logos and Episteme
- (2017) ‘Précis’ and ‘Replies to Critics’ for Book Symposium on Accuracy and the Laws of Credence, Episteme
- (2016) ‘The population ethics of belief: in search of an epistemic Theory X’ Noûs
- (2016) ‘Jamesian epistemology formalised: an explication of ‘The Will to Believe” Episteme
- (2016) ‘Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- (2015) Epistemic utility arguments for Probabilism’ (revised version) in Zalta, E. (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- (2015) ‘Pluralism about belief states’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supp. Vol.)
- (2015) ‘What chance-credence norms should not be’ Noûs
- (2015) ‘Accuracy and the belief-credence connection’ Philosophers’ Imprint
- (2013) ‘Accuracy and Evidence’ Dialectica
- (2013) ‘Epistemic utility and norms for credence’ Philosophy Compass
- (2013) ‘A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle’ Episteme
- (2013) ‘Introducing…Epistemic Utility Theory’ The Reasoner
- (2012) ‘Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle’ Philosophical Review
- (2011) ‘An Improper Introduction to Epistemic Utility Theory’ in Regt, Henk de, Stephan Hartmann, and Samir Okasha (eds.) EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009 (Springer)
- (2010) ‘An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy’ (with Hannes Leitgeb) Philosophy of Science
- (2010) An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy’ (with Hannes Leitgeb) Philosophy of Science
Social epistemology
- (in preparation) ‘Aggregating agents with opinions about different propositions’
- (in preparation) ‘Pooling: a user’s guide’ (with Jonathan Weisberg)
- (in preparation) ‘Believing is said of groups in many ways (and so it should be said of them in none)
- (2019) ‘On the Accuracy of Group Credences’ in Szabó Gendler, T. & J. Hawthorne (eds.) Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 6
- (2017) ‘Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree’ Synthese
- (2014) ‘Deference Done Right’ (with Michael G. Titelbaum) Philosophers’ Imprint
Rational choice theory
- (in preparation) ‘Effective altruism, risk, and human extinction’ (to appear in a special issue of The Monist)
- (in preparation) ‘Nudging for Changing Selves’ (to appear in a special issue of Synthese)
- (forthcoming) ‘Autonomy for Changing Selves’ in Ben Colburn (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Autonomy
- (2020) ‘Transformative experience and the knowledge norms for action: Moss on Paul’s challenge to decision theory’ in Lambert, E. & J. Schwenkler (eds.) Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change (Oxford University Press)
- (2016) ‘Illness as transformative experience’ (with Havi Carel and Ian James Kidd) The Lancet
- (2015) ‘Risk, Rationality, and Expected Utility Theory’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- (2015) ‘Transformative experience and decision theory’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Philosophy of mathematics
- (2018) ‘What We Talk About When We Talk About Numbers’ Annals of Pure and Applied Logic
- (2014) ‘Two types of abstraction for structuralism’ (with Øystein Linnebo) Philosophical Quarterly
- (2012) ‘Indispensability arguments and instrumental nominalism’ Review of Symbolic Logic
- (2012) ‘Identity and Discernibility in Philosophy and Logic’ (with James Ladyman and Øystein Linnebo) Review of Symbolic Logic
- (2011) ‘Category theory as an autonomous foundation (with Øystein Linnebo) Philosophia Mathematica
- (2010) ‘The foundations for arithmetic in finite bounded Zermelo set theory’ in Hinnion, R. and T. Libert (eds.) One Hundred Years of Axiomatic Set Theory, Cahiers du Centre de Logique
- (2009) ‘On interpretations of bounded arithmetic and bounded set theory Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
- (2009) ‘Aristotle on the subject matter of geometry’ Phronesis
- (2008) ‘Platonism and Aristotelianism in Mathematics’ Philosophia Mathematica
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