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**Academic positions**

- 2017-2021 Faculty Research Director, Faculty of Arts, University of Bristol
- 2014-present Professor of Philosophy, University of Bristol
- 2014-2015 Head of Department, Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol
- 2012-2014 Reader in Philosophy, University of Bristol
- 2011-2012 Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Bristol
- 2008-2011 British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Bristol

**Education**

- 2004-2008 PhD in Mathematical Logic, University of Bristol (Supervisor: John Mayberry) Thesis title:
*Natural, Rational, and Real Arithmetic in a Finitary Theory of Finite Sets* - 2003-2004 MA in Philosophy, University of Bristol (awarded with Distinction) (Supervisor: James Ladyman) Dissertation title:
*Fictional Worlds: a defence of fictionalism concerning possible worlds talk* - 1999-2003 BA in Mathematics and Philosophy, University of Oxford (First Class in First Public Examination; First Class in Part I and Part II of Second Public Examination)

## Publications

### Books

- (forthcoming)
*The Dutch Book Argument*(Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy) (Cambridge University Press) - (forthcoming)
*Choosing for Changing Selves*(Oxford University Press) - (2018)
*Who are universities for?*(with Tom Sperlinger and Josie McLellan) (Bristol University Press) - (2016)
*Accuracy and the Laws of Credence*(Oxford University Press) - (2011)
*Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic*(co-edited with Leon Horsten) (Continuum Press; Bloomsbury)

### Papers

- (forthcoming) ‘Internalism, externalism, and the KK principle’ (with Alexander Bird)
*Erkenntnis* - (forthcoming) ‘Transformative experience and the knowledge norms for action: Moss on Paul’s challenge to decision theory’ in Lambert, E. & J. Schwenkler (eds.)
*Transformative Experience*(Oxford: Oxford University Press) - (2019) ‘On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism’
*Noûs*DOI: 10.1111/nous.12286 - (2019) ‘Veritism, epistemic risk, and the Swamping Problem’
*Australasian Journal of Philosophy*DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2018.1563798 - (2019) ‘On the Accuracy of Group Credences’ in Szabó Gendler, T. & J. Hawthorne (eds.)
*Oxford Studies in Epistemology volume 6* - (2018) ‘What is Justified Credence?’
*Episteme*DOI: 10.1017/epi.2018.50 - (2018) ‘What We Talk About When We Talk About Numbers’
*Annals of Pure and Applied Logic*DOI: 10.1016/j.apal.2018.08.009 - (2018) ‘An Accuracy-Dominance Argument for Conditionalization’ (with R.A. Briggs)
*Noûs*DOI: 10.1111/nous.12258 - (2018) ‘Making things right: the true consequences of epistemic consequentialism’ in Ahsltrom-Vij, K. & J. Dunn (eds.)
*Epistemic Consequentialism*(Oxford: Oxford University Press) 220-240. - (2018) ‘Précis’ and ‘Replies to Critics’ for Book Symposium on
*Accuracy and the Laws of Credence,**Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*96(3):749-754, 784-800 - (2017) ‘Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree’
*Synthese*DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017-1613-7 - (2017) ‘The Principal Principle does not imply the Principle of Indifference’
*British Journal of Philosophy of Science*DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axx060 - (2017) ‘Epistemic utility and the normativity of logic’
*Logos and Episteme*VIII(4):455-492 - (2017) ‘Précis’ and ‘Replies to Critics’ for Book Symposium on
*Accuracy and the Laws of Credence,**Episteme*14(1):1-69 - (2016) ‘Illness as transformative experience’ (with Havi Carel and Ian James Kidd)
*The Lancet*388(10050):1152-3 - (2016) ‘The population ethics of belief: in search of an epistemic Theory X’
*Noûs*doi: 10.1111/nous.12164 - (2016) ‘Jamesian epistemology formalised: an explication of ‘The Will to Believe”
*Episteme*13(3):253-268 - (2016) ‘Remaking the University: an experiment in widening participation in the UK’ (with Josie McLellan and Tom Sperlinger)
*Power and Education*8(1):54-72 - (2016) ‘Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference’
*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*92(1):35-59 - (2015) ‘Risk, Rationality, and Expected Utility Theory’
*Canadian Journal of Philosophy*45(5-6): 798-826 - (2015) Epistemic utility arguments for Probabilism’ (revised version) in Zalta, E. (ed.)
*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* - (2015) ‘Transformative experience and decision theory’
*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*91(3): 766-774 - (2015) ‘Pluralism about belief states’
*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supp. Vol.)*89(1): 187-204 - (2015) ‘What chance-credence norms should not be’
*Noûs*49(1): 177-196 - (2015) ‘Accuracy and the belief-credence connection’
*Philosophers’ Imprint*15(16): 1-20 - (2014) ‘Deference Done Right’ (with Michael G. Titelbaum)
*Philosophers’ Imprint*14(35): 1-19 - (2014) ‘Two types of abstraction for structuralism’ (with Øystein Linnebo)
*Philosophical Quarterly*64(255): 267-283 - (2013) ‘Accuracy and Evidence’
*Dialectica*67(4): 579-96 - (2013) ‘Epistemic utility and norms for credence’
*Philosophy Compass*8(10): 897-908 - (2013) ‘A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle’
*Episteme*10(1): 19-35 - (2013) ‘Introducing…Epistemic Utility Theory’
*The Reasoner*7(1): 10-11 - (2012) ‘Indispensability arguments and instrumental nominalism’
*Review of Symbolic Logic*5(4): 687-709 - (2012) ‘Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle’
*Philosophical Review*121(2): 241-275 - (2012) ‘Identity and Discernibility in Philosophy and Logic’ (with James Ladyman and Øystein Linnebo)
*Review of Symbolic Logic*5(1): 162-186 - (2011) ‘An Improper Introduction to Epistemic Utility Theory’ in Regt, Henk de, Stephan Hartmann, and Samir Okasha (eds.)
*EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009*(Springer) - (2011) ‘Category theory as an autonomous foundation (with Øystein Linnebo)
*Philosophia Mathematica*19(3):227-254 - (2011) Epistemic utility arguments for Probabilism’ in Zalta, E. (ed.)
*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* - (2010) ‘An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy’ (with Hannes Leitgeb)
*Philosophy of Science*77: 236-272 (chosen for the Philosophers’ Annual 2010) - (2010) An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy’ (with Hannes Leitgeb)
*Philosophy of Science*77: 201-235 - (2010) ‘The foundations for arithmetic in finite bounded Zermelo set theory’ in Hinnion, R. and T. Libert (eds.) One Hundred Years of Axiomatic Set Theory,
*Cahiers du Centre de Logique*17: 99-118 - (2009) ‘On interpretations of bounded arithmetic and bounded set theory (2009)
*Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*50(2): 141-152 - (2009) ‘Aristotle on the subject matter of geometry’
*Phronesis*54: 239-260 - (2008) ‘Platonism and Aristotelianism in Mathematics’
*Philosophia Mathematica*16(3): 310-332

### Contributions to volumes

- (2011) ‘Probability’ in L. Horsten and R. Pettigrew (eds.)
*Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic*(Continuum Press) - (2010) ‘Logic’, ‘Indirect Test for Validity’, ‘Validity’, and ‘Formal System’
*Key Terms in Logic*J. Williamson and F. Russo (eds.) (Continuum Press)

## Book reviews

- (2018) ‘Review of Edna Ullmann-Margalit’s
*Normal Rationality: Decisions and Social Order*(edited by Avishai Margalit and Cass Sunstein)’*Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* - (2016) ‘Review of L. A. Paul’s
*Transformative Experience*‘*Mind*125(499):927-935 - (2016) ‘Review of John P. Burgess’
*Rigor and Structure*‘*Philosophia Mathematica*24(1):129-136 - (2013) ‘Review of Mark Colyvan’s
*An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics*‘*Bulletin of Symbolic Logic*19(3): 396-7 - (2010) ‘Modelling Uncertainty’ Review essay on Huber, F. and C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.) Degrees of Belief Synthese Library (2010)
*Grazer Philosophische Studien*80: 309-316

### Invited talks

- Philosophy of mathematics workshop, Princeton, 4-5 April 2020
- Philosophy of mathematics seminar, IHPST, Paris, 23 March 2020
- Philosophy in Progress 2020, Nottingham, 8-9 January 2020
- Workshop on Bounded Rationality, Harvard, 19-20 October 2019
- Workshop on probability, Rutgers, 24-26 October 2019
- Department colloquium, MIT, 5 April 2019
- Rutgers Seminar on the Foundations of Probability, Rutgers University, 1 April 2019
- Chair of Logic, Philosophy of Science and Epistemology (LoPSE), Gdansk, 1 February 2019
- Research colloquium, DRI seminar, IHPST, Paris, 25 January 2019
- Workshop on Transformative Experience, Yale University, 7-11 November 2018
- Department colloquium, Leeds University, 1 November 2018
- Moral Sciences Club, Cambridge University, 9 October 2018
- Department colloquium, Edinburgh University, 26 September 2018
- Recent Debates in Formal Epistemology, University of Cologne, 25-28 June 2018
- Workshop on Trends in Formal Epistemology, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 3-6 June 2018
- Ranch Metaphysics workshop, Tucson Arizona, 7-11 January 2018
- Book symposium on Julia Staffel’s draft manuscript, Washington University, St Louis, 9-10 December 2017
- ‘Probabilistic knowledge and the epistemology of transformative experience’, Book symposium on Sarah Moss’
*Probabilistic Knowledge*, University of Hamburg, 16-18 August 2017 - ‘What is Conditionalization and Why Should We Do It?’, Workshop on normativity and logic, University of Bergen, 14-16 June 2017
- ‘Accuracy and the Laws of Credence’, Research Colloquium, University of York, 31 May 2017
- ‘What is justified credence?’, Logic, Epistemology, and Metaphysics Forum, London, 16 May 2017
- Epistemic Utility Theory masterclass, King’s College, London, 27-29 April 2017
- ‘The Principal Principle does not entail the Principle of Indifference’ Workshop, University of Kent, Canterbury, 24 March 2017
- ‘On the accuracy of group credences’, Workshop preceding the PhD viva of Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz, University of Groningen, 12 January 2017
- ‘The Population Ethics of Belief: In Search of Theory X’, Workshop on population ethics and epistemology, University of Helsinki, 17-18 November 2016
- ‘Choosing for Changing Selves’, Topoi 2016, Munich, 27-28 October 2016
- ‘Choosing for Changing Selves’, Workshop on Transformative Experience, University of St Andrews, 22-24 June 2016
- ‘The Population Ethics of Belief: In Search of Theory X’, Formal Epistemology Workshop, Groningen University, 20-22 June 2016
- ‘Accuracy and the Laws of Credence’, Leverhulme Authors and Papers series, University of Oxford, 27 May 2016
- ‘Pluralism about Belief’, Philosophy of Science seminar, University of Edinburgh, 28 January 2016
- ‘Accuracy and the Laws of Credence’, Department Colloquium, University of California, Irvine, 2 October 2015
- ‘Accuracy and the Laws of Credence’, Department Colloquium, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 21 September 2015
- ‘Accuracy and the Laws of Credence’, Department Colloquium, University of Southern California, 18 September 2015
- ‘Accuracy and the Laws of Credence’, Department Colloquium, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 9 September 2015
- ‘Why I am Not (That Kind Of) A Structuralist’, Association for Symbolic Logic (European annual meeting), Helsinki, 3-7 August 2015
- Symposium ‘Belief and Degrees of Belief’ (with Hannes Leitgeb), Joint Sessions of the Mind Association and Aristotelian Society, July 2015
- ‘Accuracy and Calibration’, Boulder Workshop on Value, 6-7 March 2015
- ‘The True Consequences of Epistemic Consequentialism’, Workshop on Epistemic Consequentialism, 21 November 2014
- ‘What Chance-Credence Norms Could Not Be’, Symposium on Chance, Philosophy of Science Association, 6-8 November 2014
- Commentator on Hannes Leitgeb’s Descartes Lectures, University of Tilburg, 20-22 October 2014
- ‘Accuracy-First Epistemology’, History and Philosophy of Science research seminar, Cambridge University, 15 October 2014
- ‘Epistemic utility theory: a tutorial’, University of Groningen, 25-28 August 2014
- ‘Accuracy-First Epistemology’ Trends in Logic, University of Ghent, 8-11 July 2014
- ‘Conditionalization: What is it, and why should we do it?’, Reasoning Club Conference, University of Kent at Canterbury, 23-24 June 2014
- ‘What Chance-Credence Norms Should Not Be’, Chance and Conditionals, Institute of Philosophy, 18-19 June 2014
- ‘Why I’m Not (That Kind Of) A Structuralist’, Mathematizing Science: Limits and Perspectives, University of East Anglia, 1-3 June 2014
- Book Symposium on Branden Fitelson’s Coherence, Duke University, 16-18 May 2014
- ‘Accuracy-First Epistemology’, Department Colloquium, University of Arizona, 2 May 2014
- ‘Accuracy-First Epistemology’, Department Colloquium, UC Berkeley, 30 April 2014
- ‘Conditionalization: What is it, and why should we do it?’, Department Colloquium, UC Irvine, 25 April 2014
- Author Meets Critics symposium on Lara Buchak’s Risk and Rationality, Pacific APA, San Diego, 16-20 April 2014
- ‘Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference’, Sigma Club, LSE, 20 January 2014
- ‘Why I’m not (that kind of) a structuralist’, Conference in honour of Dan Isaacson, University of Oxford, 15 June 2013
- ‘Epistemic Utility Theory: Some Results’, Research Seminar, School of Economics, University of Surrey, 15 May 2013
- ‘Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference’, Research seminar, University of Cardiff, 13 March 2013
- ‘Accuracy and Evidence’, Research seminar, University of Amsterdam, 18 January 2013
- ‘Epistemic Utility Theory: Some Results’, Research seminar, University of Groningen, 17 January 2013
- ‘Accuracy and Evidence’, Research seminar, Trinity College, Dublin, 26 November 2012
- TBA, Midlands Logic seminar, University of Birmingham, 12 November 2012
- ‘Indispensability arguments and mathematical explanation’ Leeds HPS seminar, Leeds, 7th November 2012
- ‘What chance-credence norms should not be’ LSE Popper seminar, London, 1st May 2012
- ‘Decision theory in epistemology’ Decisions, Games, and Logic, Munich, 28th-30th June 2012
- ‘Accuracy’, APA Central Division meeting, Palmer House, Chicago, 15th-18th February 2012
- ‘Categorical Logic’ Foundations of Logical Consequence seminar, St Andrews, 6th December 2011
- ‘Indispensability Arguments and Instrumental Norminalism’ Institute of Philosophy seminar in Metaphysics and Logic, London, 22nd November 2011
- ‘Nominalism and the length of proofs’ Logic seminar, Notre Dame, 4th November 2011
- ‘Indispensability Arguments and Instrumental Norminalism’ Philosophy of Mathematics seminar, Oxford, 24th October 2011
- ‘In praise of determinate credences’ Choice seminar, LSE, 19th October 2011
- ‘Ketland and the Epistemological Consequences of Speed-up’, Philosophy of Mathematics seminar, ENS, Paris, 10th June 2011
- ‘Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle’, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Munich, 1st June 2011
- ‘Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle’, NYU Brown Bag Lunch Talk, New York, 22nd April 2011
- ‘Only up to isomorphism? Category Theory and the Foundations of Mathematics’ (with Øystein Linnebo), Set Theory and Category Theory seminar, Princeton, 14th April 2011
- ‘Against Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics’, ASL North American Annual Meeting, Berkeley, 24th-27th March 2011
- ‘Accuracy, chance, and the Principal Principle’, BSPS, London, 31st January 2011
- ‘Identity and indiscernibility in philosophy and logic’ (with James Ladyman and Øystein Linnebo), Structure and Identity, Bristol, 23th-25th July 2010
- ‘Nonpragmatic vindications of probabilism and diachronic norms’ (with Hannes Leitgeb), Northern Institute of Philosophy, Aberdeen, 14th-18th June 2010
- ‘Only up to isomorphism? Category Theory and the Foundations of Mathematics’ (with Øystein Linnebo), Foundations of Mathematics seminar, ENS, Paris, 21st May 2010
- ‘Only up to isomorphism? Category Theory and the Foundations of Mathematics’ (joint work with Øystein Linnebo), Centre de Logique, Université de Louvain-la-Neuve, 22nd April 2010
- ‘Epistemic utility theory and the epistemology of degrees of beliefs’, Belgian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Brussels, 21st April 2010
- ‘Updating rules for partial beliefs’, Workshop on the Lottery Paradox, University of Glasgow, 12th December 2009
- ‘The prospects for a foundation for mathematics in category theory’ (joint work with Øystein Linnebo) IP seminar, ENS, Paris, 9th November 2009
- ‘Indivisible points, continuous motions, and a foundation for mathematics in category theory’, Philosophy and Mathematics at 40 celebrations, University of Oxford, 5th July 2009
- ‘Aristotle and Lawvere on the ontology of geometry’, Ontological Shifts in Geometry, Université Paris Diderot – Paris 7, 4th-6th June 2009
- ‘The foundations of arithmetic and analysis in a theory of finite sets’, Set Theory and its Neighbours, University of Bristol, 19th November 2008
- ‘Infinity and Separation in the foundations of arithmetic and analysis’, One Hundred Years of Axiomatic Set Theory (organized by The Belgian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science), Université Libre de Bruxelles, 30th-31st October 2008
- ‘Bayesian Epistemology and the goal of accurracy’ (joint work with Hannes Leitgeb), Mathematical Methods in Philosophy (organized by The Luxemburger Zirkel), University of Bristol, 19th-21st September 2008
- ‘Non-isomorphic Natural Number Systems in a Finitary Theory of Finite Sets’, Logic Seminar, MIMS, The University of Manchester, 12th February 2008
- ‘Reply to Stewart Shapiro’s talk ‘Identity, Indiscernibility, and ante rem Structuralism: the Tale of i and -i’’, Structuralism about Physics and Mathematics, University of Bristol, 2nd-3rd December, 2006

### Conferences, seminars, and talks

- ‘The Strategy of Model Building in Climate Science’, Epistemology of Modeling and Simulation, University of Pittsburgh and MIDAS National Center of Excellence, 1st-3rd April 2011
- ‘Bayesian epistemology and the goal of accuracy’ (joint work with Hannes Leitgeb), EPSA 09, 21st-24th October 2009
- ‘Bayesian epistemology and the goal of accuracy’ (joint work with Hannes Leitgeb), Foundations of Uncertainty: Probability and its Rivals, Prague, 1st-4th September 2009
- ‘An epistemology for self-locating beliefs’, Graduate Sessions at the Joint Sessions of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, University of East Anglia, 10th-12th July 2009
- ‘On the possibility of non-isomorphic natural number systems’, Annual Conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, University of St Andrews, 10th-11th July 2008
- ‘Number systems of different lengths, and a natural approach to infinitesimal analysis’, CAMeLEoN meeting, DPMMS, University of Cambridge, 23rd April 2008
- ‘Singular Terms, Free Variables, and Platonism’, (alternate speaker and session chair) Joint Paris-Arché conference in Abstract Objects in Semantics and the Philosophy of Mathematics, École Normale Supérieure, 28th February – 1st March 2008
- ‘Platonism and Aristotelianism in Mathematics’, Annual Conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, University of Bristol, 4th-5th July 2007
- ‘Two arguments against sui generis structuralism’, Annual Conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, University of Southampton, 6th-7th July 2006
- ‘A Problem for Bayesian Epistemology (and a solution?)’, Sixth National Conference of the Italian Society of Analytic Philosophy (SIFA), University of Genoa, 23rd-25th September 2004
- ‘The Justification of Conditionalization’, Annual Conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, University of Canterbury, 8th-9th July 2004

**Funding**

- 2017-2018 Leverhulme Trust Research Fellowship (£22,537)
- 2015-2018 Leverhulme Trust International Network Grant (£77,554)
- 2013-2016 ERC Starting Researcher Grant (€972,672)
- 2011-2012 AHRC Early Career Fellowship (£35,659)
- 2008-2011 British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship (£187,816)

**Editorial Boards**

- I am a member of the Editorial Board of the
*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*as a co-editor for Formal Epistemology. - I am a member of the Editorial Board of
*Philosophia Mathematica*. - I am a member of the permanent referee panel for
*Thought*. - I am on the Editorial Board of the open-access journal
*Ergo*.

**Learned societies**

- I was a member of the Committee of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science (2013-16)
- I am a member of the Committee of the Analysis Trust

**Reviews and refereeing**

I have acted as a referee a number of times for *Annals of Statistics*, *Philosophical Review**,* *Mind*, *Philosophers’ Imprint*, *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*, *Synthese*, *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, *Review of Symbolic Logic*, *Philosophia Mathematica*, *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, *Philosophy of Science*, *Studia Logica*, *Erkenntnis*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Entropy*, and *Logique et Analyse*.

I have refereed grant applications for the National Science Foundation (NSF), Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), The John Templeton Foundation, and the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT). I served as a judge for the Sanders Prize in Epistemology in 2017. I will serve as a Nominator for the Philosophers’ Annual for 2018.

**Teaching**

Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol

- Introduction to Formal Logic (1st year; 20 lectures) Winter Term 2007, Winter Term 2008, Winter Term 2016
- What is there, and how do we know it? A history of scepticism and an introduction to metaphysics (Continuing Education; 8 lectures, 8 seminars) Spring Term 2008
- A History of Scepticism from antiquity to the twentieth century (1st year; 10 lectures) Winter Term 2008.
- Introduction to Metaphysics (1st year; 10 lectures) Spring Term 2009
- Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy (3rd year; 12 lectures; 12 seminars) Winter Term 2009; Spring Term 2010
- Philosophy of Religion (2nd year; 10 lectures) Spring Term 2010
- Probability and Rationality (3rd year; 10 lectures; 10 seminars) Winter Term 2012
- Death, Dying, and Disease (2nd/3rd year; 12 lectures) Spring Term 2016; Spring Term 2017