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Academic positions

2024-2025 John Locke Lecturer, University of Oxford
2014-present Professor of Philosophy, University of Bristol
2017-2021 Faculty Research Director, Faculty of Arts, University of Bristol
2014-2015 Head of Department, Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol
2012-2014 Reader in Philosophy, University of Bristol
2011-2012 Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Bristol
2008-2011 British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Bristol

Education

2004-2008 PhD in Mathematical Logic, University of Bristol (Supervisor: John Mayberry) Thesis title: Natural, Rational, and Real Arithmetic in a Finitary Theory of Finite Sets
2003-2004 MA in Philosophy, University of Bristol (awarded with Distinction) (Supervisor: James Ladyman) Dissertation title: Fictional Worlds: a defence of fictionalism concerning possible worlds talk
1999-2003 BA in Mathematics and Philosophy, University of Oxford (First Class in First Public Examination; First Class in Part I and Part II of Second Public Examination)

Publications

Books

(2022) Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality (Oxford University Press)
(2020) The Dutch Book Argument (Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy) (Cambridge University Press)
(2019) Choosing for Changing Selves (Oxford University Press) (Reviewed: Economics and Philosophy, Mind, The Philosophical Review, Philosophy of Science, Analysis, Philosophical Quarterly)
(2018) Who are universities for? (with Tom Sperlinger and Josie McLellan) (Bristol University Press) (Reviewed: Hong Kong Review of Books)
(2016) Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (Oxford University Press) (Reviewed: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Metascience, The Journal of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Mind)
(2011) Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic (co-edited with Leon Horsten) (Continuum Press; Bloomsbury)

Papers

(forthcoming) ‘Jeffrey Pooling’ (with Jonathan Weisberg) Philosophers’ Imprint
(forthcoming) ‘Geometric Pooling: A User’s Guide’ (with Jonathan Weisberg) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
(forthcoming) ‘Should longtermists recommend hastening extinction rather than delaying it?’ The Monist
(forthcoming) ‘Consequences of Calibration’ (with J. R. G. Williams) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
(forthcoming) ‘Formal methods’ in Marcus Rossberg (ed.) Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy
(2023) ‘Nudging for Changing Selves’ Synthese
(2023) ‘Autonomy for Changing Selves’ in Ben Colburn (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Autonomy
(2023) ‘How should your beliefs change when your awareness grows?’ Episteme
(2022) ‘Aggregating agents with beliefs about different propositions’ Synthese 20(5):1-25
(2022) ‘Accuracy-first epistemology without Additivity’ Philosophy of Science 89(1):128-151
(2021) ‘On the pragmatic and epistemic virtues of inference to the best explanation’ Synthese 199:12407–12438
(2021) ‘Radical epistemology, structural explanations, and epistemic weaponry’ Philosophical Studies 179(1): 289-304
(2021) ‘Bayesian updating when what you learn might be false’ Erkenntnis DOI: 10.1007/s10670-020-00356-8
(2020) ‘Logical Ignorance and Logical Learning’ Synthese 198(10):9991-10020
(2020) ‘A Note on Deterministic Updating and van Fraassen’s symmetry argument for Conditionalization’ Philosophical Studies 178(2):665-674
(2020) ‘Transformative experience and the knowledge norms for action: Moss on Paul’s challenge to decision theory’ in Lambert, E. & J. Schwenkler (eds.) Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
(2020) ‘The Principal Principle does not imply the Principle of Indifference’ British Journal of Philosophy of Science 71(2):605–619
(2019) ‘What is Conditionalization, and why should we do it?’ Philosophical Studies 177(11):3427-3463
(2019) ‘Internalism, externalism, and the KK principle’ (with Alexander Bird) Erkenntnis 86(6):1713-1732
(2019) ‘On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism’ Noûs 55(1):23-38
(2019) ‘Veritism, epistemic risk, and the Swamping Problem’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97(4):761-774
(2019) ‘On the Accuracy of Group Credences’ in Szabó Gendler, T. & J. Hawthorne (eds.) Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 6
(2018) ‘What is Justified Credence?’ Episteme 18(1):16-30
(2018) ‘What We Talk About When We Talk About Numbers’ Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 169(12):1437-1456
(2018) ‘An Accuracy-Dominance Argument for Conditionalization’ (with R.A. Briggs) Noûs 54(1):162-181
(2018) ‘Making things right: the true consequences of epistemic consequentialism’ in Ahsltrom-Vij, K. & J. Dunn (eds.) Epistemic Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 220-240.
(2018) ‘Précis’ and ‘Replies to Critics’ for Book Symposium on Accuracy and the Laws of Credence, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96(3):749-754, 784-800
(2017) ‘Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree’ Synthese 196:2737–2776
(2017) ‘Epistemic utility and the normativity of logic’ Logos and Episteme VIII(4):455-492
(2017) ‘Précis’ and ‘Replies to Critics’ for Book Symposium on Accuracy and the Laws of Credence, Episteme 14(1):1-69
(2016) ‘Illness as transformative experience’ (with Havi Carel and Ian James Kidd) The Lancet 388(10050):1152-3
(2016) ‘The population ethics of belief: in search of an epistemic Theory X’ Noûs 52(2):336-372
(2016) ‘Jamesian epistemology formalised: an explication of ‘The Will to Believe” Episteme 13(3):253-268
(2016) ‘Remaking the University: an experiment in widening participation in the UK’ (with Josie McLellan and Tom Sperlinger) Power and Education 8(1):54-72
(2016) ‘Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92(1):35-59
(2015) ‘Risk, Rationality, and Expected Utility Theory’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45(5-6): 798-826
(2015) Epistemic utility arguments for Probabilism’ (revised version) in Zalta, E. (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(2015) ‘Transformative experience and decision theory’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91(3): 766-774
(2015) ‘Pluralism about belief states’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supp. Vol.) 89(1): 187-204
(2015) ‘What chance-credence norms should not be’ Noûs 49(1): 177-196
(2015) ‘Accuracy and the belief-credence connection’ Philosophers’ Imprint 15(16): 1-20
(2014) ‘Deference Done Right’ (with Michael G. Titelbaum) Philosophers’ Imprint 14(35): 1-19
(2014) ‘Two types of abstraction for structuralism’ (with Øystein Linnebo) Philosophical Quarterly 64(255): 267-283
(2013) ‘Accuracy and Evidence’ Dialectica 67(4): 579-96
(2013) ‘Epistemic utility and norms for credence’ Philosophy Compass 8(10): 897-908
(2013) ‘A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle’ Episteme 10(1): 19-35
(2013) ‘Introducing…Epistemic Utility Theory’ The Reasoner 7(1): 10-11
(2012) ‘Indispensability arguments and instrumental nominalism’ Review of Symbolic Logic 5(4): 687-709
(2012) ‘Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle’ Philosophical Review 121(2): 241-275
(2012) ‘Identity and Discernibility in Philosophy and Logic’ (with James Ladyman and Øystein Linnebo) Review of Symbolic Logic 5(1): 162-186
(2011) ‘An Improper Introduction to Epistemic Utility Theory’ in Regt, Henk de, Stephan Hartmann, and Samir Okasha (eds.) EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009 (Springer)
(2011) ‘Category theory as an autonomous foundation (with Øystein Linnebo) Philosophia Mathematica 19(3):227-254
(2011) Epistemic utility arguments for Probabilism’ in Zalta, E. (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(2010) ‘An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy’ (with Hannes Leitgeb) Philosophy of Science 77: 236-272 (chosen for the Philosophers’ Annual 2010)
(2010) An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy’ (with Hannes Leitgeb) Philosophy of Science 77: 201-235
(2010) ‘The foundations for arithmetic in finite bounded Zermelo set theory’ in Hinnion, R. and T. Libert (eds.) One Hundred Years of Axiomatic Set Theory, Cahiers du Centre de Logique 17: 99-118
(2009) ‘On interpretations of bounded arithmetic and bounded set theory (2009) Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50(2): 141-152
(2009) ‘Aristotle on the subject matter of geometry’ Phronesis 54: 239-260
(2008) ‘Platonism and Aristotelianism in Mathematics’ Philosophia Mathematica 16(3): 310-332

Contributions to volumes

(2011) ‘Probability’ in L. Horsten and R. Pettigrew (eds.) Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic (Continuum Press)
(2010) ‘Logic’, ‘Indirect Test for Validity’, ‘Validity’, and ‘Formal System’ Key Terms in Logic J. Williamson and F. Russo (eds.) (Continuum Press)

Book reviews

(2023) ‘Review essay on Carol J. Adams, Alice Crary, and Lori Gruen (eds.) The Good It Promises, the Harm It Does: Critical Essays on Effective Altruism‘ Mind
(2019) ‘Review of José Luis Bermúdez (ed.) Self-Control, Decision Theory and Rationality: New Essays‘ Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
(2018) ‘Review of Edna Ullmann-Margalit’s Normal Rationality: Decisions and Social Order (edited by Avishai Margalit and Cass Sunstein)’ Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
(2016) ‘Review of L. A. Paul’s Transformative Experience‘ Mind 125(499):927-935
(2016) ‘Review of John P. Burgess’ Rigor and Structure‘ Philosophia Mathematica 24(1):129-136
(2013) ‘Review of Mark Colyvan’s An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics‘ Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19(3): 396-7
(2010) ‘Modelling Uncertainty’ Review essay on Huber, F. and C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.) Degrees of Belief Synthese Library (2010) Grazer Philosophische Studien 80: 309-316

Fiction

‘Form Seven Alpha’ (2023) After Dinner Conversation 4(10): 24-48.
‘To Light a Flame’ (2023) After Dinner Conversation 4(6): 5-18.

Funding

2024-2027 Leverhulme Research Grant (£226,666)
2021-2022 British Academy Mid-Career Fellowship (£169,741)
2017-2018 Leverhulme Trust Research Fellowship (£22,537)
2015-2018 Leverhulme Trust International Network Grant (£77,554)
2013-2016 ERC Starting Researcher Grant (€972,672)
2011-2012 AHRC Early Career Fellowship (£35,659)
2008-2011 British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship (£187,816)

Editorial Boards

I am a member of the Editorial Board of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as a co-editor for Formal Epistemology.
I was a member of the Editorial Board of Philosophia Mathematica 2012-18.
I am a member of the permanent referee panel for Thought.
I am on the Editorial Board of the open-access journal Ergo.
I am on the Editorial Board of BSPS Open.

Learned societies

I was a member of the Committee of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science (2013-16)
I am a member of the Committee of the Analysis Trust

Reviews and refereeing

I have acted as a referee a number of times for Annals of Statistics, Philosophical Review, Mind, Philosophers’ Imprint, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Synthese, Journal of Philosophical Logic, Review of Symbolic Logic, Philosophia Mathematica, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Science, Studia Logica, Erkenntnis, Philosophical Quarterly, Entropy, and Logique et Analyse.

I have refereed grant applications for the National Science Foundation (NSF), Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), The John Templeton Foundation, and the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT). I served as a judge for the Sanders Prize in Epistemology in 2017. I will serve as a Nominator for the Philosophers’ Annual for 2018.

Teaching

Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol

Introduction to Formal Logic (1st year; 20 lectures) Winter Term 2007, Winter Term 2008, Winter Term 2016
What is there, and how do we know it? A history of scepticism and an introduction to metaphysics (Continuing Education; 8 lectures, 8 seminars) Spring Term 2008
A History of Scepticism from antiquity to the twentieth century (1st year; 10 lectures) Winter Term 2008.
Introduction to Metaphysics (1st year; 10 lectures) Spring Term 2009
Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy (3rd year; 12 lectures; 12 seminars) Winter Term 2009; Spring Term 2010
Philosophy of Religion (2nd year; 10 lectures) Spring Term 2010
Probability and Rationality (3rd year; 10 lectures; 10 seminars) Winter Term 2012
Death, Dying, and Disease (2nd/3rd year; 12 lectures) Spring Term 2016; Spring Term 2017